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Introduction 
 I started studying for my master’s degree at Illinois State University in the fall of 2016 
and pursued an interdisciplinary program in political science and applied community and 
economic development. My track was unique in that it incorporated a practical experience 
component, which I am doing as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Ukraine. Prior to departing the 
United States for service, I read information regarding the history of and current political 
situation in Ukraine. I was intrigued by the reform efforts occurring in the country and decided to 
focus my master’s capstone project on public administration reform. My placement at a local 
government organization that is the direct result of post-revolution decentralization efforts 
provided an ideal case study for conducting this research, and hopefully will encourage others to 
pursue similar research in Ukraine in the future.  
In 2014, Peace Corps Volunteers were evacuated from Ukraine due to the Revolution of Dignity 
and tenuous circumstances, and the post did not reopen until 2015. It has been an honor – and 
privilege – to live and work in Ukraine at a time during which the nation is undergoing the most 
comprehensive reforms it has ever seen. The excitement and hope younger people feel for their 
country is palpable, but so is the nostalgia for days gone by as exhibited by many older 
Ukrainians. People here are some of the kindest, most resilient, and most hospitable you could 
ever meet. This study in no way seeks to undermine the integrity of those with whom I’ve built 
relationships and interacted over the last 20 months; rather, I hope this research will provide a 
foundation for conducting research in Ukraine that seriously considers the influence of culture on 
reform efficacy. 
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Chapter 1: A Bird’s Eye View of Ukrainian History  
 
Early History  
As the largest nation in Europe and Russia’s neighbor, Ukraine is a country rich in 
history, struggle, trauma, and resiliency. Considered the breadbasket of Europe, for centuries it 
has been a source of contention for other countries seeking to conquer it. Ukraine’s current 
independence is a microcosm in the grand timeline of its history, which has direct implications 
for how it has fared through independence. The country initially became autonomous in 1991 
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union but it has not achieved consistent political stability; 
Ukraine has endured two major revolutions and continued corruption since its independence.  
In its early history Ukraine was known as Kyivan-Rus, was the largest state in Europe, 
and was well-positioned on busy trade routes that contributed to its success. Efforts to conquer 
this region began in the 14th century when the area was taken by Poland and Lithuania. It was 
during this initial conquest that Ukrainians started identifying themselves as a people and there 
was a countermovement led by peasants – formally known as Cossacks – who “fled the Polish 
effort to force them into servitude” (Watch, 2016, 11). The Cossacks were powerful enough to 
rule in the 16th century and defend Ukraine as a nation but were weakened by a Polish attack 
that necessitated asking Russia for assistance; the Cossacks were tricked and Russia assumed 
ownership of Ukraine despite promising to respect their autonomy (Watch, 2016; Nalbandov, 
2014). Ukraine had another brief period of independence between 1918 and 1920, but it was not 
significant enough to warrant any major social or political shifts. The country was under Russian 
influence essentially from the end of the 18th century to the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
(Watch, 2016; Perloff, 2009).  
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Stalinism and the Holodomor  
One of the most traumatizing experiences in Ukrainian history occurred from 1932-1933 
while Stalin ruled the Soviet Union. To this day, there is disagreement over whether this was a 
genocide intentionally inflicted by the Communists or if it was merely a tragic event that 
unfortunately affected millions of Ukrainians (Motyl, 2010). The Holodomor, which in 
Ukrainian translates to “death by hunger” (Mass, 2013; Motyl, 2010; Perloff, 2009), was by 
many accounts a manmade famine imposed by Stalin as he tried to assert greater control over the 
Soviet Union. The estimated death toll rivals Hitler’s Holocaust, with more conservative 
estimates at 10 million (Mass, 2013; Perloff, 2009) and more liberal estimates at 14.5 million 
(Conquest, 1987) people who perished. The impetus for this famine was grounded in Marxism 
and class struggle as the Bolsheviks worked to collectivize agriculture and strengthen 
communism in the Soviet Union. Significant class differences did not exist in Ukraine at the time 
of collectivization (Mass, 2013; Perloff, 2009). The Bolsheviks used outcomes from a 1917-1918 
uprising, during which peasants seized land from their landlords, as the foundation for their class 
argument.1  There was a small group of peasants who fared slightly better than others in the 
aftermath of this revolt (Mass, 2013); they came to be known as kulaks and merely owning a few 
cows or more acreage were grounds for being categorized with this group (Perloff, 2009). In 
1927, there was a precipitous decline in grain output that Stalin used as leverage to provoke 
discontent between kulaks and peasants, and “Thereafter a Marxist conception of class struggle 
led to an almost totally imaginary class categorization being inflicted in the villages” (Mass, 
2013, 37). This was only the beginning of what would be Ukraine’s most terrible nightmare.  
                                                          
1 This uprising led to Ukraine’s short-lived period of independence, which lasted until 1920. 
7 
The Bolsheviks swiftly brought farms under state control; within one year, the percentage 
of collectivized farms went from 15 to 60 percent (Mass, 2013). This process was merciless 
towards Ukrainians, and peasants who resisted collectivization were forced to walk in the snow 
to the next village, where they were interrogated by local authorities; if they continued to resist, 
they had to keep walking – essentially until they died from exposure to the elements or conceded 
to the communists (Perloff, 2009). Stalin’s justification for collectivizing farms was that it would 
make them more productive, but his regime’s practices were counterintuitive to this theory 
succeeding. As part of the fabricated class struggle, kulaks were demonized when realistically 
they only fared slightly better than everyone else. The Bolsheviks spread propaganda against 
them, claiming they were hoarding property that belonged to the state and, by extension, the 
majority peasant population. Little evidence was needed to claim individuals were kulaks and 
peasants often blamed each other out of spite. The accused were apprehended by the state and 
“were either shot, deported to remote slave labor camps in Russia, or put in local labor details. 
Few survived” (Perloff, 2009, 33). Conquest (1987) postulates that half of the 14.5 million 
people he estimates died in the Holodomor were kulaks. Ironically, they were the most 
productive farmers and, after the Bolsheviks decimated their population, agricultural output 
further decreased. At this point, many peasants still resisted collectivization, and so the forced 
famine began. Stalin threatened that if output quotas were not met, which were unreasonably 
high and unattainable, his regime would confiscate all grain from the peasants (Perloff, 2009). 
Naturally, they were unable to attain these quotas and millions more starved to death. Despite 
Ukrainians’ efforts to hide foodstuffs to feed their families, the Bolsheviks became experts at 
finding even the cleverest hiding places. Additionally, farmers were only given compensation 
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when the state had what it claimed to need, and sometimes they never received compensation. 
Ivan Kasiianenko, a Holodomor survivor, remarked  
We had nothing; they had taken everything from us. They came around with their pikes, 
poked around, asked questions and grabbed my mother by the hair. They tore off my 
mother’s earrings and her cross. We children cried, but nothing helped. No one paid any 
attention to our tears. They locked our mother in the basement. So, there we were, five of 
us as children with me the oldest, and our father nowhere to be found. They came back to 
see if they had missed anything and found one egg that had not been taken. They took it 
away (Mass, 2013, 37).  
These were dark times for Ukraine; at the worst point, approximately 25,000 people died 
per day from starvation. There were so many corpses they could not be buried quickly enough 
and often the bodies were dumped into mass graves. The confiscated food was not even required 
for the communists’ wellbeing, and much of it was tossed or allowed to rot while victims were 
unable to find food anywhere (Perloff, 2009). During this time there was politicized and 
contradictory world coverage of the famine. The U.S. government did not acknowledge the 
famine or attempt to provide aid to Ukraine (Famine, 1988). News coverage in the U.S. also did 
not address the extent to which Ukrainians were suffering. Walter Duranty was a journalist for 
The New York Times who, despite his continual insistence that people in the Soviet Union 
(specifically Ukraine) were not starving, won the Pulitzer Prize for his outstanding coverage of 
Russia. Conversely, Malcolm Muggeridge, a journalist for Manchester Guardian, accurately 
reported the devastation in Ukraine and consequently lost his position with the newspaper (Mass, 
2013; Perloff, 2009).  
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Disagreements over the Holodomor’s causes and extent of consequences persist today. 
Motyl (2010) finds that most people now agree the famine occurred, but the current argument 
revolves around its cause and who was affected. National democrats assert it was a genocide 
specifically directed at Ukrainians, while pro-Soviet, pro-Russia, anti-Democrat people deny that 
it was an effort to eliminate Ukrainian national identity. In the words of Dmytro Tabachnyk, 
President Yanukovich's Minister of Education and Science, “the Holodomor of 1933 was a 
general tragedy of the peoples of Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan” (Motyl, 2010, 29). 
It remains a highly politicized event, which is reflected in the initiatives of Ukrainian presidents.  
After the Orange Revolution of 2004, popularly elected President Yushchenko sought to 
establish a stronger national identity, including recognition and acknowledgement of the 
Holodomor as a genocide inflicted by Stalin on the people of Ukraine; this elicited reactions 
from Ukrainians that were consistent with political divides in the country. The eastern part of the 
country – specifically the Donbas – is more politically aligned with Russian interests and denies 
that Ukraine’s suffering during the Holodomor was a deliberate attempt to eliminate Ukrainian 
identity.2  The following President, Yanukovich, adopted the opposite approach and promptly 
deleted information about Holodomor from the president’s website; this was considered an attack 
on Ukrainian identity and culture, but the political pendulum shows there is no consensus in 
Ukraine about what should identify them as a people, as illustrated by Ukrainian presidents’ 
political leanings since 1991.  
 
                                                          
2 The reasons for and implications of regional differences will be discussed in a later chapter. 
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Political Turbulence and Consequences  
Independence to the Orange Revolution  
The first president of independent Ukraine was Leonid Kravchuck, a former communist 
policeman whose presidency was tarnished with economic instability, despite receiving a 
financial aid package as part of severing ties with the Soviet Union (Nalbandov, 2014). 
Kravchuck ran in the 1994 election but lost to his opponent Leonid Kuchma; although both were 
former communists, Kuchma was considered slightly different because he was a former 
industrialist who rose to higher ranks based on merit, whereas Kravchuk was a party bureaucrat 
(Erlanger, 1994). The elections were held early because the economy was rapidly declining, and 
Kuchma’s campaign was largely run on the promise of improving circumstances (Erlanger, 
1994). There were initial concerns that a Kuchma administration would mean a policy shift and a 
“victory by the industrialist, Leonid D. Kuchma, shocked nationalists, who fear he will push 
Ukraine back into Moscow’s orbit” (Erlanger, 1994); this trepidation was assuaged when he 
established closer ties with the United States and United Nations, and deflected economic 
pressure coming from Russia (D’Anieri, 2003). However, his administration was wrought with 
scandal and the honeymoon during which Ukrainians hoped he would lead the country in a 
positive direction was short-lived. One of the most compromising scandals was the assassination 
of Georgiy Gongadze, a local journalist and ethnic Georgian who was known for his opinions 
against corruption (D’Anieri, 2003; Nalbandov, 2004). His headless body was found outside the 
capital of Kyiv and tapes were discovered of Kuchma giving orders to get rid of him (D’Anieri, 
2003). Although the assassination placed Kuchma in a difficult situation and compromised his 
presidency, his policy actions as president had more indirect but lasting effects on the Ukrainian 
presidency. Despite formal rules and procedures designed to prevent expansion of executive 
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power, informal power networks were crucial to Kuchma’s success as president (D’Anieri, 
2003).  
Kuchma often utilized intimidation tactics and his relationships with parliament to 
advance constitutional changes. Since these changes were approved by parliament they 
technically were considered legitimate, and those opposing him had little power to argue that 
these constitutional changes were detrimental to the country’s fledgling governmental structure 
(D’Anieri, 2003). Kuchma also attempted to amass further presidential power by establishing an 
‘upper house of parliament, which would include primarily regional representatives, many of 
whom would be appointed by the president’ (Katchanovski, 2008, 358). Carrier (2012) examined 
institutional change under the Kuchma administration because it provided an excellent case study 
for understanding how extra-institutional factors affect power relationships between the 
president, prime minister, and parliament. The quality of relationships and distribution of power 
depended on if the prime minister was loyal to Kuchma, how the parliament felt about his 
policies, and connections the prime minister and parliament developed (Carrier, 2012). Although 
there were formal rules and policies to ensure the president did not reach beyond his 
constitutionally granted power, these informal networks proved to be far more important to how 
Kuchma utilized and successfully expanded his presidential power through constitutional 
amendments. Although the West viewed adopting a constitution as a step forward – despite 
Kuchma’s expansion of presidential power – D’Anieri (2003) acknowledged that even if 
Kuchma left office, there would be little difference in how future presidencies operated unless 
there were “far-reaching and institutional political changes” (59).  
In 2004 Ukraine experienced its first major revolution since gaining independence. The 
Orange Revolution was one of a series of politically driven events occurring in other post-Soviet 
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states at a similar time (Georgia had the Rose Revolution and Krygyzstan the Tulip Revolution). 
After Leonid Kuchma’s scandalous presidency and a presidential election accused of being 
rigged, the Orange Revolution was a culmination of discontent over corrupt transitions of power 
and divisions within Ukraine over NATO membership (Katchanovski, 2008). The 2004 election 
had two candidates who illustrated political and policy divides within Ukraine. Yanukovych was 
Kuchma’s prime minister, member of the Communist establishment, politically more aligned 
with Russian interests, and did not have majority popular support; Yushchenko was considered 
the more democratic candidate, desired closer relationships with western Europe, and advocated 
for European Union membership. Exit polls showed that Yushchenko was the most popular 
candidate but Yanukovych won the election (Watch, 2016; Nalbandov, 2014). There was enough 
pressure from the populace claiming it was a fraudulent election to convince the Supreme Court 
to require another election round, which Yushchenko won (Watch, 2016). These election results 
demonstrated that claims of election fraud were at least somewhat accurate, and this peaceful 
revolution was considered a victory for the Ukrainian people.   
Despite Yushchenko’s victory, his presidency was not free from political turmoil. 
Katchanovski (2008) posits that “Previous studies have almost universally regarded the ‘Orange 
Revolution’ in Ukraine as a democratic breakthrough because it replaced a semi-democratic or 
semi-authoritarian government with a democratic government that instituted free and fair 
elections” (356; Bunce and Wolchik, 2006; Hale, 2006; Stepan, 2005). However, given the 
economic and political turmoil after Yuschenko’s victory following the Orange Revolution, he 
was forced to appoint Yanukovych as his prime minister and Yushchenko’s efforts to further 
democratize Ukraine were mostly fruitless. In 2010 Yanukovych was elected president, 
“marking an almost 180-degree reversal from the volatile democracy to possible stable but 
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stagnant rule” (Nalbandov, 2014, 59). Yanukovych promised the Ukrainian public that the 
country would sign an association agreement with the European Union but he simultaneously 
aligned economic policies with Russia (Afineevsky, 2015), a maneuver that preceded violent 
protests across the nation.  
The Revolution of Dignity (Euromaidan)  
More politically-charged protests began in 2013 when the Ukrainian government refused 
to sign an association agreement that would advance them towards partnership with the 
European Union (EU) (Afineevsky, 2015; Shveda & Park, 2015). At the time, Ukrainian 
president Yanukovych had the lowest approval rating since the country declared independence, 
suggesting that the legitimacy of the government was compromised (Shveda & Park, 2015). 
Despite optimism that the Orange Revolution advanced Ukraine towards a more democratic 
system, the country failed to comprehensively reform its government since independence; it 
remained an ineffective system that was a combination of Soviet and oligarchic models. 
According to Shveda and Park (2015), “the current political crisis in Ukraine is simply the 
external manifestation of a systemic crisis: the political elite’s lack of will to reform and their 
inefficiency in policymaking since the 1990s” (86); this “lack of will”, and other extraneous 
factors related to political division, prompted students to protest the government’s refusal to sign 
the agreement with the EU.   
The protests began on November 21, 2013 in Kyiv and students rather than political 
parties played a crucial role in driving growth of the movement (Shveda & Park, 2015). The 
protests were initially peaceful – the atmosphere was more like a festival for freedom and being 
considered a part of Europe – with students demanding that the government return to foreign 
policies that would continue to improve Ukraine’s trajectory toward European integration 
14 
(Afineevsky, 2015; Shveda & Park, 2015). However, “On the night of November 31, as the 
Maidan dwindled to less than half a thousand activists (most of them were students), authorities 
sent two thousand security forces, who dispersed the youth in a cruel and ruthless manner” 
(Shveda & Park, 2015, 87). These police were called Bekrut and had a reputation for corruption; 
they used iron sticks to beat the student protestors, which inflicted significant damage, and 
resulted in confusion and chaos. This was the first time as an independent nation when 
Ukrainians saw their authorities so openly brutalize the citizenry and demonstrate their disdain 
for peaceful protests (Afineevsky, 2015). What started as a peaceful protest turned into a battle 
between government and citizens, during which the government continued to use weapons 
against the citizenry (Shveda & Park, 2015).   
Following police brutality against the students, the March of the Millions attracted 
hundreds of thousands of people to demonstrate that they disapproved of and were angry about 
what happened. Euromaidan grew essentially overnight from a protest mostly confined to Kyiv, 
to a movement across the nation (Afineevsky, 2015). Mykhalivs’kyi Zolotoverknyi Monastery, 
also known as St. Michel’s golden-domed monastery, became a sanctuary for protestors; there 
were a drop-off for warm clothes, a food center, and a medical center all available to assist 
Euromaidan protestors. On December 11, 2013, during a particularly horrendous night of 
fighting between the government and protestors, leaders at the same monastery felt they needed 
to do something to demonstrate further support for those risking their lives to maintain Ukrainian 
autonomy. The monastery rang all their bells at once and they could be heard throughout Kyiv – 
a demonstration that hadn’t been done since 1240A.D., when the Mongol-Tatars invaded Kyiv 
(Afineevsky, 2015). During the stage of Maidan-sich (struggle), the government attempted to 
prohibit public assembly but that only further emboldened protesters (Shveda & Park, 2015). 
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Although protestors failed to seize presidential headquarters, they succeeded in overcoming the 
Kyiv state administration building and it became a sort of refuge for protestors; film footage 
shows them dancing, laughing, and playing music, despite the mayhem occurring outside 
(Afineevsky, 2015).   
The Revolution of Dignity exhibited remarkable camaraderie despite the seemingly 
insurmountable obstacle that was the Ukrainian government. People came from all over the 
country with donations of food and clothes; medical workers traveled with all the supplies they 
could manage to provide their services to the wounded. Retired military offered their skills to 
teach protestors how to resist attacks, patrol, and defend their territories. Those who owned 
vehicles spearheaded a parallel protest called Automaidan, crowding the streets and impeding 
traffic in solidarity with the original protestors. The 2014 New Year celebration in Kyiv 
commenced with protestors chanting, “Slava, Ukrayini!” or “Glory to Ukraine!” Regarding the 
general sentiment of Ukrainians risking their lives for the cause, one protestor lamented  
We are not afraid to die for freedom. Freedom is for us. Freedom is ours. We will win, 
and Ukraine will be part of Europe, and Ukraine will be part of the free world! And we’ll 
never be slaves. We will be free (Afineevsky, 2015).  
In February 2014, the protestors demanded three political actions for the government to take 
before they would stand down: to release prisoners, to establish equal power between the 
executive and legislative branches, and to hold early presidential re-elections. The government 
did not immediately yield and fighting continued, culminating in fatal battles during which 
protestors continued to risk their lives as they attempted to rescue their wounded while still under 
fire. After 93 days of chaos, the Ukrainian government acquiesced to their demands and 
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President Yanukovych fled Ukraine on February 22, 2014 (Afineevsky, 2015). Although the 
president was overthrown and the government conceded to protestors, Shveda and Park (2015) 
posit that the Revolution of Dignity needed to continue in Ukrainians’ hearts if it would result in 
a complete government restructuring and/or overhaul. While Euromaidan thwarted Ukraine’s 
descent into authoritarianism, the “revolution will be deemed completed only when the newly 
formed coalition successfully implements a new political system with the approval of a majority 
of Ukrainians. In the end, this will determine the fate of Euromaidan” (Shveda & Park, 2015, 
91).  
A Question of Origin 
 It is impossible to consider Ukraine’s rich cultural and political history without 
discussing its variable status over time with Europe and Russia. Prior to declaring independence 
in 1991, Ukraine had only one brief period of sovereignty from 1918 to 1920 and was 
significantly influenced by competing forces for hundreds of years. From the 16th century to the 
present day, the country has been regionally divided consistent with how power over these 
regions shaped demographics.3  A primary consequence of regional differences is that Ukraine 
does not have a “continuous state-tradition” (Kappeler 2014, 110); perceptions of Ukrainian 
history, and the direction in which Ukraine should head in the future, are contingent on 
competing narratives that fail to capture the full history of Ukraine. 
                                                          
3 Western Ukraine is characterized by Polish, Hungarian, and Romanian influences, and presence of the Habsburg 
Monarchy in the 19th century. Central Ukraine was ruled by Poland-Lithuania from the 16th to 18th centuries, and 
only became Russian territory in the mid-17th to early 18th century. From the 18th century onward, the steppes of 
southern Ukraine were populated mostly by Ukrainian-Russian peasants. Eastern Ukraine attracted many Russians 
since the 19th century with its industrial and mining sectors (Kappeler, 2014). 
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The Story of ‘Big Russia, Little Russia’ 
 Since Russia has had significant influence in Ukraine, the status of Ukrainian people in 
Russian policy has fluctuated between Russians viewing Ukrainians as vital to the success and 
richness of Russian culture, to conversely seeing them as an inherently inferior people whom 
Russia needs to civilize. The concept of Russia as big brother and Ukraine as little brother first 
emerged in the 17th century, but perspectives on the meaning of this relationship certainly 
differed. Through the lens of Ukrainian writer Semen Divovych, who wrote poetry in 1762 
regarding the relationship between Great Russia and Little Russia, one could conclude that the 
early years of Russia’s presence in Ukraine were more of an equal partnership between a larger 
and smaller nation; that Ukrainians considered themselves an independent and autonomous 
people (Kappeler, 2003). In his verses, Divovych responds to Russia’s assertion of being greater 
by saying, 
 I know, that you are Russia, 
 and this is my name too.  
 Why do you frighten me? I am brave myself. 
 I have become subject not to you, but to your lord,… 
 Do not think that you yourself are my ruler, 
 But your lord and my lord are in command of both of us.  
 And the difference between us is only in adjectives, 
 You the Great and I the Little live in bordering countries. 
 That I am called Little and you Great 
 Is not a strange thing to you or to me. 
 For your borders are wider than mine,… 
 Yet we are equal and form one whole, 
 We swear allegiance to one, not to two lords - 
 Thus, I consider you equal to myself (Kappeler, 2003, 7; Lindheim & Luckyj, 1996). 
 
While this poetry illustrates the spirit of Ukrainian people, it also romanticizes their past with 
Russia. 
 Divovych’s poetry is an example of the Cossack myth and the freedom they supposedly 
enjoyed during these early years with Russia, which has been canonized in Ukrainian culture and 
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is a popular version of history among Ukrainian people. When he wrote the poem, Catherine II 
(also known as Catherine the Great) was working to integrate Little Russia into the greater 
nation. The verses illustrate the intention of Ukrainians to remain an autonomous nation, despite 
their integration with Russia, but ultimately this was “wishful thinking of the Cossack elite” 
(Kappeler, 2003, 8). Although there were periods when Ukrainians were treated as relatively 
equal with Russians, the primary theme is one of russification.  
 After the 18th century, Ukraine was totally absorbed into Russian culture; from language 
to customs to religion, Russian and Ukrainian culture became so intertwined that today it is 
difficult to distinguish what is strictly Russian, and strictly Ukrainian – even the Ukrainian 
language is considered by many people, Europeans and Americans included – to be a dialect of 
Russian (Kappeler, 2014). In the 19th century Ukrainians attempted to question an all-Russian 
nation and cultivate their own national identity, to which Russia responded by persecuting 
Ukrainian culture and language from 1863 to 1905. Relations seemingly improved post-1917 
revolution and endured even through the Soviet Union circa 1920s. During this period of respite, 
the Soviet Union considered its previous imperial policies exploitative of other nations, and 
instead advanced policies that placed Ukraine on more equal footing with Russia. However, 
Stalin’s regime quickly eradicated any sense of equality between the nations, and Ukraine was 
reduced to “an obedient little sister of the great Russian brother” (Kappeler, 2003, 8). Stalin’s 
regime also inflicted the Holodomor on Ukrainians, a manmade famine that killed millions and is 
considered the Holocaust of Ukraine (Conquest, 1987; Mass, 2013; Motyl, 2010; Perloff, 2009). 
Even after Stalin’s death, the authoritarian nature of the Soviet Union continued and had lasting 
impact on Ukraine. 
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 Aside from Russia’s history of general dominance over Ukraine, there were less direct 
factors that also contributed to russification. Russia has long considered Ukraine a peasant 
culture, one which is their duty to civilize. In the 19th century, the “modern Ukrainian language 
and culture, which were under construction since the beginning of the century, were 
provincialized and limited more and more to the peasants. Only a small group of educated 
Ukrainians declared support for the Ukrainian language and culture and initiated an Ukrainian 
national movement” (Kappeler, 2003, 32). However, 19th century Ukrainians were educated in 
Russian schools and universities, meaning they viewed their own culture through a Russian lens. 
The use of family dynamics to describe the relationship between these two countries only further 
clouded cultural distinctions and resulted in Ukraine having a sort of inferiority complex. 
Initially, the big brother/little brother image illustrated how Ukraine should show deference to 
Russia and not overreach its authority. Using family dynamics as a descriptor for Russia-Ukraine 
relations has only complicated Ukraine’s fight for independent statehood. 
The Problem of a Single Story 
The dichotomy between Russian and Ukrainian historical narratives derives from the 
debate over Kyivan-Rus, which was a large and successful state in Europe during Ukraine’s 
early history (Country Watch, 2016; Kappeler, 2003; Kappeler, 2014;). In the Russian/Soviet 
narrative, Russia and Ukraine share a common heritage that started with Kyivan-Rus. In the 19th 
century, Russian historians published a history that was disseminated through official – and 
authoritative – textbooks, which prevails today. This narrative also discusses Ukraine’s voluntary 
union with Russia in WWII and focuses on the implausible notion that the two nations can be 
separate because Ukrainians and Russians are one people (Kappeler, 2003). The family dynamics 
used to illustrate Russia-Ukraine relations help clarify the Russian lens through which history 
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between the two nations is perceived, and to understand why Russians would feel the two nations 
are inseparable when considering that they have long thought Ukraine to be a little brother. 
Although the Russian narrative focuses on the two nations being one people – i.e. a family – 
there are problematic characteristics of this perspective, such as Russia’s refusal to this day to 
acknowledge that the Holodomor was a genocide (Kappeler, 2014; Motyl, 2010); Russia 
considering Ukraine a peasant culture, and therefore inferior (Kappeler, 2003; Kappeler, 2014); 
using the Orthodox church for continuing hegemony over Ukraine (Kappeler, 2014); and the 
issue that the “periods, during which Ukraine was part of other states, above all Poland-
Lithuania, are interpreted as times of national and religious oppression” (Kappeler, 2014, 112). 
Although scholars (Watch, 2016; Nalbandov, 2014; Perloff, 2009) ascertain that other states 
attempted to assert dominance over Ukraine and didn’t necessarily treat them as equals, the 
Russian narrative fails to acknowledge that Ukrainians have suffered to varying degrees over 
time under Russian rule as well. 
There are symbols throughout Ukraine that challenge the Russian narrative; these include 
the trident, Cossack princes and Ivan Mazera on currency, statues of Taras Shevchenko (a 
beloved 19th century poet), and the name of Ukrainian currency (hryvna). It is not disputed that 
these people had an impact on the Ukrainian people, but in the context of the Ukrainian historical 
narrative “Foundation myths, heroes, villains, defeats, and victories are identified – and 
sometimes invented – so as to create ‘narratives’ that have implications for contemporary 
political movements” (Motyl, 2010, 26); without these foundation myths and the Ukrainian 
version of history, it can be argued that there would have been no impetus for the Orange 
Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity. Additionally, part of the canonized Ukrainian 
historical narrative is that they belonged to Poland-Lithuania for two centuries longer than 
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Russia and therefore have stronger ties to Europe (Kappeler, 2014), but what Ukraine views as 
‘the West’ has evolved over time contingent on circumstances. For example, initially when 
Germany occupied the country, Ukrainians behaved favorably toward the Germans because their 
opinion of the Soviet Union was low, given their experience during Holodomor. However, their 
amicable feelings toward Germany faded when they realized that Germans also viewed 
Ukrainians as an inferior population (Rywkin, 2014). Despite current United States foreign 
policy positions on the situation in Ukraine, shortly before Ukraine declared themselves an 
independent state in August 1991, U.S. President George H.W. Bush gave his famous ‘Chicken 
Kiev’ speech, during which he urged Ukraine to unite with Russia (Rywkin, 2014). In other 
words, even western policy positions have not always expressed support for a Ukraine 
independent from Russia. 
The reality of these two nations’ historical narrative is that they are both biased. The 
Russian narrative focuses heavily on their empire, culture, language, and rhetoric around the 
familial ties between Russia and Ukraine; the Ukrainian narrative is skewed towards the 
foundational myths of the Cossacks (Kappeler, 2003). An accurate historical narrative is far 
more complicated, given the cultural interrelationship between Russian and Ukraine.4  The 
similarities between their language, culture, and religion are prevalent enough to complicate 
distinguishing between them. Given Russia’s great influence on eastern European states over 
time, it is difficult to designate the Tsarist and the Soviet empires as strictly Russian because 
their impact was not confined to the modern-day national borders of Russia (Kappeler, 2003). 
The migration of people throughout eastern Europe, particularly ethnic Russians to Ukraine, 
                                                          
4 A more in-depth analysis of Ukrainian history is outside the scope of this paper; a detailed overview of Ukrainian 
history can be found in various sources on the subject (Kappeler, 2000; Magocsi, 1996; Subtelvy, 1994). 
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further blurs the boundaries between Ukrainian and Russian narratives; political ideology is 
regionally divided consistent with Ukraine’s demography, and contributes to political instability 
that persists today.5  
  
  
  
                                                          
5 Regional differences will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 2: Ukraine After Euromaidan 
 The Revolution of Dignity, or Euromaidan, was significant for various reasons; not only 
did the protests signify the first time Ukrainians witnessed outright police brutality against the 
populace, but it also provoked governmental reforms that had not been the result of either 
independence from the Soviet Union or the Orange Revolution in 2004. The resignation of 
Yanukovych and early election of not President Poroshenko was only the beginning of an 
ongoing complicated reform process occurring at all levels of government in Ukraine. Although 
there have been some visible systemic changes due to these nascent reforms, there remain 
cultural and demographic issues that may or may not impede Ukraine’s decentralization.  
Demography, Language, the Issue of Crimea, and War in the Donbas 
 The demographic makeup of Ukraine perpetuates socio-political differences that might 
otherwise be ameliorated if the majority had a common thread they could utilize in their cultural 
and political narratives. As Ukraine developed into a more urban and industrialized nation over 
time, Russians felt encouraged to migrate and settle in Ukraine. As Kappeler (2014) noted, from 
the 18th century onward the southern region of the country was primarily comprised of 
Ukrainian-Russian peasants, and 19th century industrialization prompted Russian migration into 
the eastern region of the country. Ethnic Russians constitute roughly 17 percent of the entire 
Ukrainian population, and they are primarily concentrated in eastern and southern Ukraine 
(Charnysh, 2012; Kappeler, 2014). Although almost one-fifth is a considerable portion of the 
population, even more people speak Russian as a first language – nearly 50 percent (Kappeler, 
2003; Kappeler, 2014). These realities perpetuate complications associated with determining 
Ukraine’s future trajectory and sovereignty. 
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 Politicians have effectively used the linguistic dichotomy as a tool for eliciting a sense of 
identity, and therefore mobilizing electoral blocs. This strategy has been successful because in 
Ukraine, language is regional and historically has been a major source of contention in the 
country.6  Charnysh (2012) calls this strategy “identity bidding” and posits that it has been 
intrinsic to Ukrainian politics since independence from the Soviet Union; it is effective in 
Ukraine because the extent to which  
identity-based strategies mobilize votes depends on the emotional valence of a particular 
cleavage…In Ukraine, language arguably evokes strong sentiments because of the 
emotional scars left by centuries of forced russification under Russian tsars and the 
Soviet government (Charnysh, 2012, 3). 
It’s important to emphasize that while 17 percent of the population in Ukraine is ethnically 
Russian, language does not equal ethnicity. Nearly 16 percent of self-declared Ukrainians 
consider Russian their native tongue, and even more speak it in their homes (Charnysh, 2012). 
Although everyday language usage may not foster hostility among Ukrainians, its utility in 
politics is strengthened by a “pro-Russian elite glorifying the Soviet past, vilifying Ukrainian 
nationalists and narrowing the space for the Ukrainian language” (Samokhvalov, 2015, 1385). 
The politicization of language has deepened the chasm between ideological camps in Ukraine, 
and it is inextricably linked to the historical narratives which Ukrainians claim to be true. 
 One of the most hotly contested regions in Ukraine is the Crimean Peninsula, which was 
annexed by Russia in March 2014, shortly after the Revolution of Dignity ended (Myers & 
                                                          
6 Ukrainian historically was mostly spoken by peasants and considered an inferior language. Even in the 19th 
century, only a small group of educated Ukrainians spoke their native language and advocated for wider usage. 
Furthermore, Ukrainian is often misidentified as a Russian dialect by foreigners, rather than its own language 
(Kappeler, 2003; Kappeler, 2014). 
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Barry, 2014; Treisman, 2016). Ukrainian President Yanukovych’s government fell on February 
21, 2014, and Russia annexed the region roughly a week later (Myers & Barry, 2014). However, 
Russian President Putin’s reasons for acquiring the region are not entirely clear. Interpretations 
regarding motive include fear that NATO was expanding, that Ukraine would join NATO, and 
subsequently that Ukraine would oust Russia’s Black Sea fleet from Sevastopol; that Russia is 
trying to reclaim territories of the former Soviet Union; that Putin was trying to protect ethnic 
Russians in Crimea and promote the peninsula’s self-determination; and that it was merely a 
quick response to Ukrainian President Yanukovych’s failed government (Treisman, 2016).  The 
theory that Putin annexed Crimea to protect ethnic Russians can be discarded because the 
Ukrainian nationalist threat there was fabricated; additionally, Putin showed little to no interest 
over the years in whether the peninsula could self-determine (Treisman, 2016). There is some 
weight to the argument that the maneuver was strategic to reclaim territories of the former Soviet 
Union, especially given that Crimea has only been part of Ukraine since the mid-20th century. 
The region was originally settled by Tatars and for part of its history was protected by the 
Ottoman Empire, before it was conquered by Catherine the Great and made a Russian territory. 
In 1954, former Soviet statesman Nikita Khrushchev gifted the peninsula to Ukraine to 
commemorate the country’s 300th anniversary of being united with Russia (Rywkin, 2014). 
However, Putin’s actions leading up to the annexation do not make total sense when considered 
alongside the theory that seizing Crimea was an imperial plot to restore the Soviet Union. There 
is speculation that Putin was unaware Yanukovych’s government would crumble until just before 
it happened, and this is supported by the $3 billion Russia loaned to Ukraine in December 2013 – 
after the Revolution of Dignity already started (Treisman, 2016). It is possible that annexing 
Crimea was merely a product of circumstance. Ukraine was nowhere near NATO membership 
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when Russia seized the peninsula, given that Yanukovych’s government was enacting policies in 
the opposite direction (Afineevsky, 2015; Samokhvalov, 2015; Shveda & Park, 2015; Treisman, 
2016). Considering that Russian troops were already present in Crimea, and that the region is too 
small to thrive economically if autonomous, it is plausible that annexing the peninsula was the 
most strategic option at the time (Treisman, 2016). Regardless of the impetus behind seizing the 
peninsula, Crimea has a large ethnically Russian population that supports Russian interests, 
much like other regions in eastern Ukraine. 
 In February 2014, Russia supported separatist rebels in eastern Ukraine and ultimately 
provoked a war that continues today. The conflict was sparked when President Yanukovych was 
ousted from Ukrainian government as a result of the Revolution of Dignity (Coman, 2017). The 
war is occurring in a region known as the Donbas, which is primarily Russophone and was an 
industrial giant prior to Ukrainian independence. The Donbas has suffered economically since 
independence, and partial impetus behind separatist ideology is economic instability. Overall, 
Ukraine’s annual gross domestic product (GDP) has not improved significantly since 
independence (Coman, 2017). However, there is regional disagreement around the direction in 
which Ukraine should go with economic interests. Ukrainians farther east largely support closer 
alliance with Russia, but “From Kiev to Lviv, western Ukrainians are desperate to integrate 
further, believing that EU disciplines will normalize one of the most corrupt societies in the 
world and boost one of the least successful economies of all the former Soviet states” (Coman, 
2017). Despite economic interests provoking the war, prior to 2014 the region produced 16 
percent of Ukraine’s GDP but is now flailing (Buckley, Clem, Fox, & Herrod, 2018). Although 
the 2015 Minsk ceasefire agreements attempted to stop violence and reintegrate separatists into 
Ukraine (Coman, 2017), the current situation is a stalemate. Buckley, Clem, Fox, and Herrod 
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(2018) designate the war in the Donbas as “among the worst humanitarian crises in the world.” 
More than 13,000 people have died in the war, but the total number of victims exceeds 40,000 
(Number of donbas conflict victims exceeds 40,000 – UN, 2019). Infrastructure in the Donbas is 
crumbling as a result of warfare; children cannot go to school, people do not have heat and/or 
running water because pipes are damaged, people do not have access to vital medicine, doctors 
are difficult to find, and numerous hospitals have been damaged (Buckley, Clem, Fox, & Herrod, 
2018; Coman, 2017). The war has displaced thousands of people throughout Ukraine, and 
considering regional ideological differences, eastern Ukrainians are not always able to easily 
integrate in other parts of the country (Coman, 2017). Presently there is no viable solution to the 
conflict that has torn apart Ukraine; while the country combats separatists and Russian 
aggressors in the east, it also contends with other issues instigated by Russia. 
The Sea of Azov and Continued Dependence on Russia 
 On November 25, 2018, conflict escalated between the Ukrainian and Russian navy fleets 
in the Sea of Azov. This body of water lies on the eastern side of Crimea, closer to Russia. As 
Ukrainian ships were passing from the Black Sea through the Kerch Strait, to the Sea of Azov, a 
Russian border guard boat opened fire on them (“Russian border guard boat opens fire on 
Ukrainian Navy Ships”, 2018). There are trading ports on the Sea of Azov and access to these is 
vital to Ukraine’s economy, considering 80 percent of the country’s exports pass through this 
region (“Ukraine and russia take their conflict to the sea”, 2018). Although Ukraine and Russia 
have officially been able to freely use the body of water since a 2003 agreement (“Russia-
ukraine sea clash in 300 words”, 2018; “Ukraine and russia take their conflict to the sea”, 2018), 
construction on a bridge between Russia and Crimea has complicated the arrangement, and since 
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early 2015 “Moscow has subjected Ukrainian vessels to its own authorization procedures to 
traverse the strait” (“Ukraine and russia take their conflict to the sea”, 2018).  
Of course, there is disagreement between the two nations – and the international 
community – regarding why the Russian guard boats opened fire; Russia claims that the 
Ukrainian ship was in Russian waters, but further analysis of exact coordinates confirmed that 
both boats were in international space. The conflict provoked Ukrainian President Poroshenko to 
initiate martial law for a 30-day period, during which additional security checkpoints were 
established and Russian immigration to Ukraine was restricted (“Russia-ukraine sea clash in 300 
words”, 2018). Although there was no further escalation, the provocation is an example of how 
Ukrainians are constantly reminded of the omnipresent Russian threat. 
Despite Russian aggression towards Ukraine, the dark reality is that Ukraine still depends 
on them for necessary resources, such as gas. Ceasing trade with Russia would be detrimental to 
Ukraine, given that they are the country’s primary trading partner (Kappeler, 2014). Ukraine’s 
heavy dependence gives Russia a political tool that they can use for manipulation (Rywkin, 
2014), and further complicates situations such as the conflict in the Sea of Azov. The obvious 
solution for circumstances like these would be for Ukraine to cut some ties with Russia  but 
doing so would mean committing national suicide and plunging the country into a resource 
crisis. Although the hryvnia – Ukrainian national currency – has stabilized (Haring, 2017), 
people are still suffering an economic crisis and relations with Russia remain a delicate balance. 
Given Ukraine’s comprehensive reform process in the wake of Euromaidan, questions remain 
regarding how this dependence on Russia will be managed in the future. 
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Decentralization, Corruption, and Looking Forward 
 The 2013-2014 Revolution of Dignity sparked a wave of governmental reforms unlike 
any Ukraine had seen since independence from the Soviet Union. The process continues today 
and permeates all levels of government but moving forward has been fraught with lack of clarity 
and continuity. Ukraine is a unitary state, meaning that it is centralized, and the bulk of 
authoritative power is in the national government (Kozyrev, 2019). However, the post-revolution 
climate has seen efforts to decentralize and combine smaller communities so that there are fewer 
levels of administrative bureaucracy; this process is called amalgamation and has been a 
voluntary endeavor for communities, but it is expected that by 2020 all communities eligible to 
do so will have amalgamated (Erheshov, 2019).  
 Currently the Ukrainian national government has three branches: executive, legislative, 
and judicial. The executive is comprised of the President, Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 
Central Elections Commission, Constitutional Court, Prosecutor General’s Office, and National 
Anti-Corruption Bureau (Kozyrev, 2019) – this last institution is a direct result of the revolution, 
decentralization, and attempts to mitigate corruption in a culture where it is rampant. An example 
of executive power is budget decentralization, which is conducted by different ministers who are 
designated by the President and approved by the legislature. The legislative branch is called the 
Verkhovna Rada and there are 450 representatives who serve five-year terms; half are selected 
via ballot/self-nomination, and the other half are selected according to party affiliation. A recent 
example of legislative power is approving martial law when it was declared by the President, 
following Russian aggression towards Ukrainian ships in the Sea of Azov. The judiciary branch 
– or Supreme Court – sets national government responsibilities, but the actual workings of this 
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branch are confusing for everyone because their responses vary (Kozyrev, 2019); i.e., they fail to 
set and follow precedents. 
 Ukraine is made up of 24 oblasts, a region that is akin to a state in the United States; the 
autonomous region of Crimea; and two cities of special significance, which are Kyiv and 
Sevastopol. There also are raions, which are like counties in the United States (Kozyrev, 2019). 
The primary purpose for amalgamation is to transfer power and resources to local communities 
(Erheshov, 2019) because prior to starting this process it was concentrated in the national 
government. The administrative levels of government that existed before amalgamation fostered 
confusion and were conducive to high levels of corruption because it was never clear who was 
accountable. The ultimate goal is to eliminate the raion level and only have amalgamated 
communities, but this has created a power struggle between the old and new systems (Kozyrev, 
2019); the reality is that people are losing their positions/jobs as a consequence of this process, 
and determining who will hold positions of power in the future is causing contention. Regarding 
boundaries for communities, there are pockets between some that have amalgamated but the goal 
is to have contiguous boundaries so that all communities are part of larger administrative centers 
(Kozyrev, 2019). Amalgamation has created challenges that were not relevant to the old 
administrative structure, such as local communities needing to draft their own budgets, foster 
participatory government, promote transparency, and fight corruption. 
 Budget decentralization also is a result of the Revolution of Dignity, and it is independent 
of compiling and executing budgets. This process includes improved governmental transfers, 
optimized spending authority, and communities independently developing their local budgets. 
There is a national/local tax system in Ukraine, but community leaders don’t always know how 
to explain to constituents the importance of paying taxes, and the services and/or infrastructure 
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they provide; there is a need to develop a better tax culture at the local community level. There 
are additional opportunities to improve local budget revenue that include improved employee 
qualifications, better administration of tax money, and working more closely with taxpayers. 
However, continued problems with budget transparency, alienation between authorities and the 
public, and ensuring continuity make genuine progress towards effective budget decentralization 
more difficult (Malynyak, 2019). 
 Ukraine, like many other post-Soviet states, is notorious for corrupt practices at all levels 
of society. Three anti-corruption agencies were established from 2015-2018 in the wake of the 
Revolution of Dignity (Koriukalov, 2019), including the executive branch’s National Anti-
Corruption Bureau (Kozyrev, 2019); this illustrates a concerted national effort to address this 
rampant issue. Although a high percentage of Ukrainians feel that corruption is common, few 
believe they have the power to improve the situation. Through surveys and value-based focus 
groups, MSI Worldwide discovered that 41.5% of participants indicated having actual 
experience with corruption, but there are discrepancies in what is perceived as corruption. 
Participants differentiated between governmental and everyday corruption, and generally didn’t 
feel that everyday corruption was an issue (Koriukalov, 2019). There is the perception that the 
overall situation in Ukraine is terrible but that individual communities are perfect (Daschakivska, 
2019), a sentiment which aligns with Dickinson’s (2017) assertion that Ukrainians’ habit of 
pessimism is the most damaging enemy to reform and progress. People are over-sensitized to 
corruption but are not necessarily able to recognize these practices in themselves; media 
coverage perpetuates perceptions that corruption is rampant and unsolvable, while there remains 
little individual accountability in everyday life (Koriukalov, 2019). The negativity Ukrainians 
feel toward their overall structure is pervasive and they are able to find the worst aspects in any 
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situation and turn them into reasons explaining why efforts will not work and/or are not worth 
pursuing (Dickinson, 2017). Respondents from MSI Worldwide’s research indicated they want 
systemic change but cannot articulate how this should be achieved (Koriukalov, 2019), and lack 
of understanding how change can be achieved is compounded by negativity that serves the 
function of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Constantly talking down Ukraine’s chances hampers the 
post-Maidan transformation process in real ways. It makes it much more difficult for reformers 
to maintain the momentum needed in order to overcome decades of inertia. It consolidates the 
status quo and strengthens the position of those who advocate resignation in the face of 
impossible odds (Dickinson, 2017). 
When asked if they would be willing to participate in anti-corruption activities, 36.5% 
indicated they are ready to do so, while only 11.5% indicated they already actively participate in 
such efforts (Koriukalov, 2019); this demonstrates that even if there are opportunities to 
participate in anti-corruption activities, most Ukrainians would not engage. Suggested solutions 
for combatting not only corruption but also general disengagement among the populace include 
increasing access to services, digitizing services, and working with youth. (Koriukalov, 2019). 
Fortunately, despite attitudes remaining pessimistic towards national-level corruption, 
perceptions of corruption at the local-level have decreased (“Ukraine poll: local outlook 
improves as national pessimism remains high”, 2017), indicating that perhaps reforms at the 
local level are having a positive impact. 
Although the country is actively reforming and there is uncertainty regarding whether 
these efforts will have staying power, there is positive work happening to support a post-Maidan 
Ukraine. Transparency International strives to influence perceptions of corruption, and they have 
methodologies and roadmaps that can assist organizations in Ukraine working in this area. There 
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is a coalition of non-governmental organizations that collaborates to have a louder voice and be 
heard by local government; an example of one such coalition is the Center for Reform in 
Ternopil, Ternopils’ka Oblast (Ishchenko, 2019). There have also been efforts to increase citizen 
participation in budget hearings, and persuading people to understand it is their right to 
participate (Malynyak, 2019). It is important to consider that while there are non-governmental 
efforts to support the reform process, the situation in Ukraine remains delicate. Haring (2017) 
posited that the “sad reality is that Ukraine’s reforms have stalled, and the window of 
opportunity is starting to close.” With the presidential election approaching on March 31, 2019 – 
and a runoff scheduled for April 21 – the reform momentum that has been building since the 
Revolution of Dignity concluded could turn as quickly as it started. 
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Chapter 3: Administrative Frameworks and Post-Soviet 
Reformation 
  
Models for Reform in Post-Communist Europe  
 There are three public administration models that are considered more traditional and are 
addressed in existing research regarding reform in post-Soviet space: Weberian, Neo-Weberian, 
and New Public Management. The Weberian model was created by Max Weber, the prominent 
19th century German philosopher, sociologist, and political economist. The Weberian tradition is 
the most hierarchical of all public administration models and focuses on clearly defined duties, 
job security for civil servants, and established rules of conduct. It is important to respect 
authority regardless of opinion, individuals are hired as administrators based on merit, and there 
is an expectation that those entering administrative fields will become career civil servants 
(Czaputowicz, 2015; Goran, 2009; Weber, n.d.). Advantages of the Weberian approach include a 
high degree of professionalism, continuity, clear responsibilities, and protections of the public 
interest, since administrators are hired on merit rather than other factors – such as political 
affiliation (Czaputowicz, 2015; Goran, 2009). However, this approach also might inhibit change 
due to its highly structured nature and it may be ineffective for addressing citizens’ needs. Some 
scholars argue this model is not sufficient to meet demands in the modern world and that it 
mistakenly assumes changes in law automatically provoke change in people’s behavior; “for that 
to happen, a change in people’s mindset is necessary, which does not automatically follow the 
change of law” (Czaputowicz, 2015, 9). Goran (2009) opines that while the model has some 
disadvantages, the Weberian tradition may be most effective for implementing reforms in post-
Soviet space because their systems are historically hierarchical. The guidelines of Weberian 
administration may be necessary for ensuring lasting reform efficacy in post-Communist 
countries because these nations’ systems most resemble Weberian’s basic structure. However, it 
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also is possible that the Weberian model may only perpetuate existing issues in post-Soviet 
space. 
 The Neo-Weberian model for public administration is somewhat less focused on 
hierarchy, but still retains many tenets of the Weberian tradition. There is more emphasis on 
public needs and a degree of representative bureaucracy,7 which is achieved by focusing less on 
internal rules. Both the Weberian and Neo-Weberian traditions assume that civil servants will act 
rationally instead of pursuing personal interests in their administrative capacity, and critics also 
argue that these models neglect to acknowledge how outside actors influence the field of public 
administration; i.e., these models assume that public administration is the only institution 
affecting the public despite there also being influential nongovernmental actors, such as 
community organization and private corporations (Czaputowicz, 2015). Although Neo-Weberian 
administration attempts to incorporate representative bureaucracy, it does not account for how 
external environments affect bureaucracy. 
 New Public Management (NPM) is a market-based approach to public administration. 
This model assumes that the public and private sectors are not inherently different, and therefore 
a privatized approach can be taken with bureaucracy (Goran, 2009). Similar to economic 
approaches to markets, NPM focuses on efficiency and how public demand should drive 
administrative policy (Czaputowicz, 2015; Goran, 2009). Within this framework, people 
accessing administrative services are essentially customers and it is the government’s 
responsibility to convince the public to support administrative decisions (Czaputowicz, 2015). 
                                                          
7 Representative bureaucracy is a form of administration that prioritizes representation of the population in the 
actual makeup of civil servants. In other words, bureaucrats should reflect the demographic characteristics and 
values of the population(s) they represent (Krislov, 1974). While Neo-Weberian bureaucracy does not quite reach 
this level of representation, it incorporates eliciting citizens’ opinions to try and meet public needs. 
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Czaputowicz (2015) and Goran (2009) disagree regarding the appropriateness of NPM as a 
model for public administration in post-Soviet space; while Czaputowicz (2015) argues that this 
approached has improved administration because it is more responsive to public needs, Goran 
(2009) posits that it is not the ideal model because the “liberalisation of working conditions in 
practice leads to further politcisation and destablisation of public services” (108). Although NPM 
is much less structured than the Weberian and Neo-Weberian models, treating the public sector 
like an economic market may further entrench administrative habits developed when nations 
were in the Soviet sphere. 
 While the Weberian, Neo-Weberian, and New Public Management frameworks differ in 
some respects, they all incorporate a degree hierarchy and structure. The opposite of these 
models is New Public Governance (NPG), which is an administrative framework that is naturally 
horizontal and most aligned with open systems theory.8  This framework acknowledges the 
relationship between government and nongovernmental actors, and “Governance refers to 
horizontal interactions in which public and private actors on many levels coordinate their 
operations to implement policies and provide public services” (Czaputowicz, 2015, 10). Of all 
the models, NPG is most likely to consider cultural factors and attempt to remain culturally 
unobtrusive. This strategy may be beneficial in post-Communist nations because it accounts for 
the importance of “better policy participation, coordination and cooperation of central and local 
administrations, as well as non-governmental institutions” (Goran, 2009, 109). Like other post-
Soviet nations, Ukraine has a weak civil society and people generally distrust governmental and 
nongovernmental institutions, which creates challenges when nongovernmental organizations 
                                                          
8 An open system theory accounts for the symbiotic relationship between administration and external 
environments. Essentially, administration is affected by outside factors, and the external environment is also 
affected by actions within administration (Gaus, 1947). 
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attempt to mobilize the public towards better civic engagement (Lutsevych, 2013). Government 
and weak civil society are both responsible for the unsuccessful democratization of post-Soviet 
nations, and 
The weakness of civil society not only renders citizens helpless to prevent backsliding by 
ruling elites, it also allows those holding power to commit abuses. This is vividly 
illustrated in Ukraine. Selective justice in imprisoning opposition leaders, media 
censorship, corruption, raids on businesses and the use of force against non-violent 
protests are just some examples of the country’s degradation (Lutsevych, 2013, 10). 
Since NPG is structurally horizontal, it might be useful for challenging hierarchies, 
politicization, and corrupt practices promoted by a ruling elite. This framework is entirely 
devoted to building trust between administration and the public, and resources used for 
maintaining hierarchy and internal rules within the traditional models are redirected in NPG to 
ensure administration is adequately meeting public needs (Czaputowicz, 2015; Goran, 2009). 
This framework has potential to bridge the divide between government and citizens and 
contribute to the overall health of civil society in post-Communist nations. While the lack of 
strict guidelines and hierarchy make NPG more flexible, there is criticism that focusing too much 
on public needs and not enough on internal organization can inhibit administration’s efficacy 
(Czaputowicz, 2015). 
 There is no consensus on which of the four public administration frameworks is best for 
implementing reform in post-Soviet space. There are obvious challenges with affecting change in 
these countries, given the history of politicized administrations in the Soviet Union. Some 
nations have attempted reform since the dissolution of the USSR; research regarding the success 
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of reforms in Slovenia, Romania, and Albania provides helpful insight into the process and 
whether reforms became institutionalized.  
Comparing Administrative Reforms in Post-Communist States 
  Although several decades have passed since the USSR dissolved, post-Soviet nations still 
are struggling with successfully reforming public administration. Existing research shows that 
these countries have applied administration systems from abroad, which can be problematic 
because this approach fails to acknowledge that cultural values 
are in fact the cornerstones of state and administrative systems, shaping the structure and 
culture of administrative organizations. Administrative traditions change, but are path 
dependent, so the same reform measure implemented within different administrative 
traditions may result in very different outcomes. Administrations do not stem from the 
same model and move in the same direction (Goran, 2009, 107). 
In other words, culture plays a significant role in shaping the direction of administrative systems; 
models from abroad are not immune from being manipulated to align with ingrained cultural 
values. The literature suggests that implementing foreign administrative systems in post-
Communist countries has been inconsistent with their cultural values, and commonly cited 
obstacles to effective reform are politicization and institutionalization. Reform experiences in 
Slovenia, Albania, and Romania provide insight into the success of transplanting administration 
systems from abroad. 
 Slovenia adopted administration reform directly from western frameworks, with little to 
no modification based on country-specific needs and was considered a model country for 
administrative reform in post-Soviet space. Relative to other countries in the Soviet sphere, 
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Slovenia fared better than others and maintained some political standards originating from 
Communism as it was practiced in the USSR while implementing western administrative 
frameworks (Bugaric & Kuhelj, 2015). The persistence of Communist political norms was a 
significant obstacle to the success of western frameworks, and ultimately long-established 
informal rules in this environment undermined the formal rules that were aligned with 
administrative models and initiated during reform. The friction between cultural norms and 
reform did nothing to combat politicization in Slovenia, and the country was unable to 
effectively institutionalize reform; civil service remains a sector in which elites promote their 
self-interest on the premise of political criteria (Bugaric & Kuhelj, 2015). 
 While working towards membership in the European Union (EU), Romania was subject 
to oversight during reform implementation. Initially they transitioned successfully to an impartial 
civil service, but that success seems to have been tied to EU supervision. The country was under 
conditional reforming from 1996 to 2006 while trying to gain EU membership, and during this 
time they practiced administrative standards such as merit-based appointment/hiring for civil 
servants and refraining from discussing personal political beliefs while operating in a 
professional capacity. After becoming an EU nation, Romania regressed to old patterns 
established during Communist rule; like Slovenia, the country’s administrative system remains 
highly politicized due to inadequate reform institutionalization.  
 Albania’s experience with public administration reform differs from the aforementioned 
cases, in part due to cultural values that stem from former incorporation in the Ottoman Empire 
versus the Habsburg tradition. Slovenia and Romania both descend from the Habsburg tradition, 
which emphasized rule of law and a bourgeois society; Albania’s Ottoman history did not foster 
an environment for more adherence to such standards and resulted in a patrimonial form of 
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Communism and highly corrupt administrative system (Škarica, 2012). Compared to other post-
Soviet nations, Albania also suffered more under Stalinism and human rights abuses were 
rampant. After independence from the USSR, reform was further hindered by a civil war and 
other external factors; initial attempts at public administration reform were too like socialist 
traditions for the sector to be de-politicized, and there are questions regarding whether a non-
western public administration framework would have been more suitable for Albania (Škarica, 
2012). Although Albania incorporated more European Union (EU) standards at the turn of the 
21st century, when the country began working towards EU membership, Škarica (2012) notes 
that “almost every report accentuates implementation problems; the reforms are not rooted 
enough in the minds of people implementing them. Institutionalization of reforms is still 
embryonic” (384). 
Existing research demonstrates issues with reforming public administration in various 
post-Soviet countries. However, little research exists regarding the situation in Ukraine. 
Considering the nation’s history and continued problems with political instability, analysis of 
administrative reform may provide useful information regarding why they have been unable to 
effectively democratize and implement reforms. 
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Chapter 4: Situating the Research  
 
Conceptual Framework  
As a Peace Corps Volunteer in Ukraine, the researcher seeks to determine whether 
politicization and institutionalization are barriers to effective public administration reform in her 
country of service.9  Since the Revolution of Dignity in 2013-2014, the country has endured 
numerous policy changes aimed at comprehensively reforming government and decentralizing 
administrative systems. While there is a range of research assessing public administration 
reforms in other post-Soviet states (Bugaric & Kuhelj, 2015; Goran, 2009; Iancu, 2013; 
Nalbandov, 2014; Škarica, 2012), there is little research on the subject for Ukraine. Considering 
the nation’s relatively recent political revolution and efforts to reform, this is an opportune 
moment in Ukraine’s history to assess the efficacy of public administration reforms, and whether 
they are subject to issues associated with politicization and institutionalization.   
This research was conducted with two underlying assumptions: the first is that based on 
Ukraine’s history, the general trend exhibited by other post-Soviet nations regarding problems 
implementing democratization and public administration reforms will hold; the second is that the 
Communist history of Ukraine is one obstacle to effective change (Stevens, 2017, 6-7). There are 
various lenses through which this research could be conducted but given the researcher’s 
position as an outsider in her community of service, a culturalist approach is the most appropriate 
lens for assessing how Ukraine’s history contributes to the obstacles it has encountered while 
trying to democratize. Culturalist theory was suggested by Eckstein (1988) as a lens for 
explaining political change. This approach is rooted in concepts of human development and 
                                                          
9 For the scope of this research, “effective” refers to how resilient public administration reform is to issues of 
politicization and institutionalization; i.e., whether reform efforts are becoming successfully ingrained in a culture 
that is notoriously politicized and corrupt. 
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behavior, and how learned behaviors manifest in society. The theory relies on the idea that 
human behavior is guided by orientations, which are learned behavior patterns that people 
develop earlier in life. Orientations are not spontaneous and are formed by culture; they are 
inherently different from attitudes because they cannot be easily circumvented. They essentially 
are the control center for the brain and the lens(es) through which people process and react to the 
world around them (Eckstein, 1988).  
All people have orientations, but when they occur on a larger scale – i.e. among large 
populations – they are referred to as “culture themes” and guide reactions and actions for 
affected demographics (Mead & Metraux, 1954). Culture themes are important for 
conceptualizing this research because they are pervasive and not easily penetrated. It is difficult 
to alter orientations in culture themes because they are comprised of early learned behaviors with 
significant permanence. They are dichotomous and dictated by dynamics such as trust-distrust, 
hierarchy-equality, coercion-liberty, and parochial-national identifications (Pye & Verba, 1965), 
which are useful to reference for this research given Ukraine’s history and current political 
situation. The researcher will be able to analyze how decentralization efforts affect Ukraine’s 
orientation in these dichotomies, considering the country’s political pendulum swings between 
the extremes that align with these dynamics.  Additionally, culture themes will be useful for 
understanding how Ukraine’s reform efforts compare with those in other post-Soviet spaces. 
Some countries have been more successful with reforming public administration than others, and 
Nalbandov (2014) argues that Georgia, Belarus, and Ukraine have different reform outcomes 
because they have variable cultural and/or political climates, which have more impact on change 
than typically referenced economic circumstances. Lovelace, the Director for the Strategic 
Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, opined that 
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Nations democratize at a different pace: Some achieve high governance standards, lasting 
political stability, and robust economies; others are lingering in their desires to look and 
act like their democratic counterparts. While no country strictly follows patterns of 
democratic institutionalization, there is a variable that defines the rate of success of their 
efforts: their political cultures (Nalbandov, 2014, vii). 
Overall, a culturalist lens will be especially useful for understanding behavior in the context of 
reform implementation.  
Service in a Local Government Organization 
 The researcher was placed in a local government organization that is the direct result of 
decentralization efforts in Ukraine; it is one of the administrative centers created to provide 
better service provision to constituents. Located in western Ukraine in Rivnens’ka Oblast, the 
Rivne Center for Administrative Services was opened on January 29, 2016 with the participation 
of Ukrainian President Poroshenko. This administrative services center has a reputation for being 
the best of its kind in Ukraine. These centers represent a national effort to unite regional 
authorities, eliminate unnecessary levels of bureaucracy, streamline services, and make services 
more accessible to the populace. The organization’s mission at which the volunteer is placed is: 
Creation of a single space for the provision of administrative services and organizing cooperation 
between local governments and civil society, in order to generate new creative solutions for the 
development of the city of Rivne. 
The Rivne Center for Administrative Services has five sectors. In passport services, 
employees can issue, replace, and exchange international passports for Ukrainian citizens. People 
visit residence registration to address all needs related to their places of residence, and this proof 
of residence is needed for voting, business, taxes, etc. – similar to residence registration 
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requirements in the United States.10  The sector for administrative services fulfills constituents’ 
multiple administrative needs including architecture and construction, land relations, trade and 
catering, security of state labor, ecology and natural resources, and forestry and hunting. Public 
registration of legal persons and physical business entrepreneurship deals with all administrative 
services related to registering businesses and public associations. Finally, the sector for public 
registration of real property deals with all matters regarding real estate in the region. In 2017 
these five sectors served a total of 245,101 people; the busiest sector was residence registration, 
which served nearly half of all visitors that year. 
The researcher’s volunteer placement is constructed in the format of an open office. All 
administrators are visible and there are few individual office spaces. Upon arriving, visitors 
approach reception and receive a number in the queue. There are smart screens placed 
throughout the building that show the numbers and sectors next in line, and which administrator 
visitors need to attend. An express services option is available for some, depending on their 
administrative needs. The entire system feels much like going to the Department of Motor 
Vehicles in the United States; it’s very organized and efficient, as far as administrative 
bureaucracy is concerned. 
The sponsor for Peace Corps Ukraine’s community development (CD) project is the 
Ukrainian Ministry of Regional Development, and the CD logical project framework (LPF) was 
updated in 2018 to reflect the ministry’s desire to focus more on organizational capacity 
development. The LPF has three objectives, which are to strengthen organizations’ capacity and 
promote organizational learning; improve organizations’ project design and management 
                                                          
10 These requirements are similar in theory, but actual practical application will be discussed in more detail later. 
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practices; and promote collaborative engagement among organizations and community 
stakeholders. The Rivne Center for Administrative Services waited two years to receive a Peace 
Corps Volunteer, whom they desired to assist with streamlining practices, improving employee 
engagement, strategic planning, developing Rivne in the model of a SMART city, engaging 
youth, and collaborating with community partners to promote better community engagement. 
Based on how their self-identified needs fit within the context of the Peace Corps Ukraine CD 
LPF, a volunteer’s work should focus on developing people within the organization to strengthen 
their capacity for developing and implementing projects related to their needs. After observing 
dynamics within the organization, the researcher determined her skills would most likely 
contribute best to developing employees so they could effectively work on improving employee 
engagement, strategic planning, engaging youth, and collaborating with community partners. 
Overall, the Rivne Center for Administrative Services is an ideal placement for 
conducting research related to public administration reform through a cultural lens. Considering 
it and organizations like it are the direct result of decentralization efforts, these institutions have 
an opportunity to develop practices and organizational culture that limit politicization and 
contribute to overall reform institutionalization; since they did not exist prior to Euromaidan, 
they may not be subject to pre-revolution organizational practices that might inhibit reform. 
Conducting this research through a culturalist lens will help the researcher analyze how broader 
cultural norms influence organizational development and implementation of public 
administration reforms in Ukraine. 
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Methodology  
Delimitations  
While problems inhibiting effective public administration reform are not limited to 
politicization and institutionalization, this research is limited to these two obstacles because the 
literature for other post-Soviet states most commonly refers to them as barriers (Bugaric & 
Kuhelj, 2015; Goran, 2009; Iancu, 2013; Nalbandov, 2004; Škarica, 2012). Considering the 
literature commonly cites politicization and institutionalization, it is reasonable to assume that 
these are known obstacles and therefore useful for conducting similar research in Ukraine. 
This is a small-scale qualitative study confined to the researcher’s placement at a local 
government organization as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Ukraine. Information and prior scholarly 
research are useful for providing context that illustrates how history affects present 
circumstances at the researcher’s volunteer placement. Although community development Peace 
Corps Volunteers devote 24 months to serving with an organization in their community, a 
significant amount of time is spent learning about and integrating with the culture. Therefore, it 
would be unrealistic to conduct research beyond the scope of the researcher’s volunteer 
placement. The small-scale nature of this study allows the researcher to conduct a more in-depth 
analysis of the organization in which she is placed and provide detailed accounts of their 
administrative role in her community of service.  
Data Collection 
 Qualitative research methods were utilized in this research. While quantitative analysis 
would have been valuable for conducting research related to public administration reform in 
Ukraine, data in the country is notoriously unreliable and often inaccessible. There also may 
have been a language barrier while using quantitative data, and information easily could have 
been lost or manipulated when translating information from Ukrainian/Russian to English. Given 
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the researcher’s limited time in-country and lack of enough language skills, qualitative research 
is most appropriate for conducting this study.  
 The researcher employed a triangulation of qualitative research methods to ensure an 
accurate representation of public administration reform implementation in Ukraine. The primary 
research methods used were case study and autoethnography. The Rivne Center for 
Administrative Services was the case study subject and with this method the researcher seeks to 
establish the following: how Ukrainian public administration reform compares to other models of 
reform in central and eastern Europe (Goran, 2009; Czaputowicz, 2015); how impartiality and 
political environment contribute to organizational behavior, which will serve as measures for 
politicization; and attitudes toward policy implementation, which will serve as a measure for 
institutionalization.11  Analysis of these two indicators, politicization and institutionalization, 
will help the researcher determine the effectiveness of public administration reform. Within the 
organization, the researcher also looked for documents that could contribute to 
institutionalization because they provide institutional memory, such as meeting minutes and 
operations manuals. Finally, the researcher determined if the Rivne Center for Administrative 
Services has a strategic plan, which may help the organization resist politicization and 
institutionalization because the plan provides long-term goals and objectives to follow. 
 Autoethnography is not typically used as a method for public administration research, but 
the researcher’s unique position as a member of an Ukrainian community and organization 
                                                          
11 More concrete definitions for politicization and institutionalization emerged in-country, compared with those in 
the initial research proposal, because the researcher considered grounded theory. While existing research provides 
useful definitions for these obstacles to reform, no country’s situation is exactly like another’s; an understanding of 
how these challenges manifest in Ukraine were able to emerge because grounded theory allows for “the 
complexity and variability of phenomena and of human action; the belief that persons are actors who take an 
active role in responding to problematic situations; [and] the realization that persons act on the basis of meaning” 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1990, 9). This theory also complemented a culturalist approach. 
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provides an ideal opportunity to conduct this type of observational, experience-based research. 
Rhodes (2014) opined that  
Observational fieldwork has two long-established virtues. It gets below and behind the 
surface of official accounts by providing texture, depth and nuance, so our stories have richness 
as well as context…These tools lead us into the office, the engine room of public administration, 
where the state is continuously enacted and reshaped. They enable us to explore the contending 
beliefs and practices of elites. They seek out the silent voices of bureaucracy. Above all, they 
lead to surprises, to moments of epiphany, so we look at the world through different spectacles 
(326). 
While ethnography is the collection of information based on the researcher’s observations 
as an outsider, autoethnography differs in that observations are formed based on experiences of 
the researcher as a participant. This study was conducted in the context of participant-as-
observer; this method is ideal for conducting this study because of the researcher’s role as a 
Peace Corps Volunteer and her active participation in Ukrainian culture. The researcher has a 
background in nonprofits and social service delivery, which cultivated a perspective that differs 
from that of traditional Weberian, Neo-Weberian, and New Public Management – models 
commonly associated with public administration reform in central and eastern Europe (Goran, 
2009). In practical application, the researcher applies a management/administrative lens that 
most aligns with an open systems approach to administration, which is most like the New Public 
Governance framework. Considering existing research demonstrates that other post-Soviet 
spaces have had trouble implementing reforms with more traditional hierarchical structures, there 
is opportunity to explore approaches that challenge these hierarchies. In order to document 
experiences for the autoethnographic method, the researcher maintained a journal detailing her 
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service within the Rivne Center for Administrative Services, and how her approach to 
administration was received by her colleagues. 
Data Analysis 
 For the case study at her volunteer placement, the researcher utilized any organizational 
documents accessible and/or available such as a strategic plan, meeting minutes, operations 
manuals, annual reports, etc. to establish presence or lack of institutionalized practices echoing 
administrative reform. She also observed and analyzed written organizational communication; 
interactions between leadership, management, and administrators; interactions between 
administrators and clients; and any improvements made within the organization during her 
service. Since these institutions were initiated as part of decentralization, there are no historical 
documents prior to 2016 that might contribute to this case study. While analyzing the 
autoethnography, the researcher looked for patterns with her documented experiences and 
whether they were negative or positive.  
Limitations 
There are four limitations with this research. The first is a language barrier that inhibits 
the researcher’s overall understanding of happenings within the Rivne Center for Administrative 
Services. All Peace Corps Volunteers complete three months of intensive training prior to 
settling in their community of service, and the researcher did not commence this study 
immediately upon arriving at her site. However, the Ukrainian language is incredibly difficult to 
learn and understand; the grammar and rules are different enough from English that they can be 
hard to fully grasp, which inhibits understanding of the language’s nuances. Additionally, it is 
rare to hear pure Ukrainian, Russian remains widely spoken, and surzhik is a combination of 
both languages that is used as well. Essentially, volunteers spend significant time trying to 1) 
discern what language they’re hearing and 2) process what is happening around them. 
50 
The second limitation is time. While the researcher has been in her country of service for 
20 months and has integrated into the community, she is still an outsider and will 1) never be 
entirely privy to more sensitive information related to government and public administration, and 
2) be unable to completely understand how Ukrainian governmental and administrative systems 
work because she is not from this culture. Research could not be conducted during training, there 
was a learning period when the researcher arrived at site, and not all time was spent at the 
volunteer’s host organization. 
The third limitation is the expected reality versus the actual reality of how organizations 
utilize their Peace Corps Volunteer. Although the Rivne Center for Administrative Services 
identified needs for which they wanted a volunteer, it was not always clear how the researcher 
could help address those needs – and sometimes assisting with them was not even feasible or 
appropriate. There are instances in which organizations do not fully understand the purpose of 
Peace Corps Volunteers and how to fully utilize them, which was often the case with the Rivne 
Center for Administrative Services. The researcher was their first volunteer and while she had 
steep learning curves associated with living and working in a foreign culture, the organization 
also needed to learn how the partnership should work. 
The fourth limitation is challenges related to Peace Corps service generally. The 
experience can be isolating, degrading, frustrating, and demoralizing for the volunteer; at times it 
feels like being a helpless child again. Although service in Ukraine on the surface seems 
significantly easier than many other Peace Corps posts – e.g. volunteers are not digging wells or 
fighting malaria – there are aspects of Ukrainian culture that make service just as difficult, only 
in a different way. The culture can feel openly aggressive to Americans, and there are many 
micro-aggressions volunteers are faced with daily that contribute to demoralization. The 
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researcher has experienced conditions and emotions that many volunteers face in service – 
depression, frustration, hopelessness, loneliness, anger – and these negative emotions may have 
contributed to a more pessimistic slant in her autoethnography. The researcher did not foresee 
that she should consider the effects of Peace Corps service and how that perspective would 
inform the research. 
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Chapter 5: My Peace Corps Service in a Ukrainian Local 
Government Institution 
 Since December 2017 I have been working at the Rivne Center for Administrative 
Services, a local government organization created to establish decentralized and more efficient 
administration practices in Ukraine after the Revolution of Dignity in 2013-2014. This 
experience and others related to increasing knowledge of Ukrainian government, such as the 
2018 and 2019 local government retreats for Peace Corps Volunteers, have provided significant 
insight into reform processes and efficacy. The following experiences I detail through case study 
and autoethnography are merely one example of public administration in Ukraine and should not 
be taken to represent the entire country; however, I hope this study will provide a foundation for 
continued research on the subject in Ukraine. 
Rivne Center for Administrative Services Case Study 
 This administrative services agency has the best reputation of organizations with similar 
missions in Ukraine and is viewed as a highly organized and efficient institution. They serve 
thousands of people each year, and these agencies have helped increase access to and expedite 
services for Ukrainians; they appeared throughout the country after the Revolution of Dignity 
and in transliterated Ukrainian are called a tsentr nadannya administratyvnykh posluh, or ЦНАП. 
The Rivne Center for Administrative Services is a subsidy of city council, is led by a director, 
employs lawyers to help interpret legislation, and is divided into departments with individual 
managers. All employees are required to be knowledgeable with these laws and practices: local 
governance, the constitution, anti-corruption, and administrative services. There are two 
department-specific laws staff need to know, freedom of movement (residence registration) and 
economic permits (administrative services). There are lawyers employed at the center to help 
with interpreting the legislation but administrators also are expected to have working knowledge 
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of the law pertaining to administrative services; all employees in the center (lawyers and 
administrators) are required to take an exam assessing this knowledge, which is mandated by the 
anti-corruption institutions that came out of the Revolution of Dignity. The standards and 
procedure for this exam are unclear. When I initially arrived at the center in December 2017, 
employees needed to take the test every five years or when they changed sectors within the 
organization. They were waiting for the exam to be scheduled when I arrived, and it ultimately 
occurred in March 2018. It was merit-based in that it assessed administrative law competency, 
but employees did not necessarily take it upon being hired; city council determined when it was 
scheduled each year, and any new staff would take it at that time. The five-year time limit had 
not yet been reached because the Rivne Center for Administrative Services only opened in 2016. 
The test contained three questions and employees would hand write their answers. In late 2018, it 
was announced that all staff would need to pass an oral attestation. This upset many people in the 
organization because they were concerned that the panel would ask questions regarding their 
personal lives, that they would not be able to articulate their answers very well, and/or that they 
would become emotional and be unable to complete the attestation. Some employees participated 
in the attestation and passed, but for unknown reasons the remaining ones were cancelled and no 
one else needed to take it. Considering the confusion with the oral attestation and it not being an 
original testing requirement, there are now questions regarding when and how often staff will 
need to be tested in the future – and in what format.  
 On March 1, 2018 there was an emergency meeting held with employees at the Rivne 
Center for Administrative Services. They had been waiting since before my arrival to learn when 
employees would need to take their exam, but city council was lagging with determining a 
timeframe. At this meeting, all people working under a monthly contract – e.g. those who had 
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not passed the exam and were not yet employed long-term – learned that the center could no 
longer pay them because they ran out of budget, and that they would need to wait until the exam 
period before receiving a paycheck again. These contracted employees were encouraged to 
continue coming to work as ‘volunteers.’ They also learned that a month earlier they struggled to 
pay the salaries of many employees because they ran out of money. The organization’s budget 
issues are intriguing because employees at this center are payed the lowest salaries of all the 
other ЦНАП agencies in Ukraine. They receive budget from city council, and in conversations 
with the center’s director I learned that she tried to convince the mayor to increase 
administrators’ salaries. A colleague once showed me her paycheck and I was appalled to learn 
that it was barely more than what I receive as a Peace Corps Volunteer – before I account for the 
funding Peace Corps also provides for volunteer housing. Not only are the center’s employees 
not paid enough to thrive in the city, some also had to survive for more than a month without pay 
because there was no budget. 
Since the center is a young institution, they do not have a well-established institutional 
memory that could help with constructing an organizational timeline. Legislation relevant to the 
center’s operations occurs at the national level and is disseminated through individual local 
governments. The organization lacks a strategic plan but administrative law changes rapidly and 
frequently, which creates numerous obstacles to drafting and implementing a strategic vision. 
Each department develops an annual plan to guide their yearly activities, but beyond annual 
planning legislative changes are impossible to anticipate and often organizations operate in 
survival mode.  
 There are no operations manuals and/or established standard operating procedures (SOP) 
to guide administrators. I work closely with one administrator who also acts as my translator, and 
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for months she has advocated for SOPs; she feels that there are instances when she and no one 
else knows what to do because there is no documented procedure, and that an additional 
consequence is inconsistency between administrators. When participating in departmental 
meetings, no one was designated to take meeting minutes. I have not been invited to meetings 
with leadership (director, deputies, managers) and therefore have been unable to determine if 
minutes are taken in those spaces. The center maintains hard copy archives of all documents 
completed each day, and the paperwork is extensive and possibly cumbersome. There is an 
electronic system for inputting information, but it appears that not all processes have been 
streamlined electronically.  
Earlier in this paper I mentioned that the department of residence registration provides 
services that are similar to registering places of residence in the United States, but unlike going 
to a single location like a Driver’s License Division to obtain identification and register an 
address, Ukrainians must visit two agencies to complete this process. The first is actually where 
residents obtain a posvidka, which is essentially an identification card that demonstrates a 
person’s legal residence in Ukraine. Through my experience of renewing my posvidka, I 
discovered that working with this institution can be difficult, especially for someone who doesn’t 
really understand processes and requirements in Ukraine. They maintain hours that are difficult 
to remember and an appointment must be made. Additionally, obtaining this identification card 
is expensive and likely cost prohibitive for many Ukrainians, considering the depressed 
economy. Fortunately, Peace Corps manages information and costs for registering volunteers, 
but we were unaware of costs to renew until the morning of our appointment; this illustrates lack 
of consistent and accessible information. After obtaining the posvidka, residents visit the Rivne 
Center for Administrative Services to register their addresses; each time a person moves, the 
56 
previous address must be deregistered and the new one entered into the system. Prior to 2018, the 
posvidka was a booklet much like an international passport, and the center would stamp the 
booklet and provide registration information within that. Ukraine recently transitioned to cards 
like driver’s licenses in the United States, but they don’t include address information. Residents 
are provided a piece of paper with their residence information and presenting it is necessary for 
various activities. There has been at least one occasion when I forgot this paper and was unable 
to open a bank account when I needed, despite having the physical posvidka with me.  
Regarding communication in the center, interactions between employees at the same 
hierarchical level seem congenial and mostly without major conflict. However, the organization 
relies significantly on hierarchy. Communication between levels appear to lack openness and 
comfort. Every Peace Corps Volunteer is assigned an Ukrainian counterpart with whom they 
ideally work on projects, and my counterpart manages the department for residence registration. 
She is responsible for managing the activities and administrators within her department, and she 
reports to the director’s deputies and director herself. The deputies also provide oversight to the 
individual departments. In mid-2018 they changed the deputy supervising my counterpart’s 
department, and after this transition there was an obvious positive change in her demeanor that 
she attributed to feeling more comfortable with the new deputy supervisor. She felt the former 
deputy was unapproachable and interacting with her was always stressful; I can attest to this as 
my interactions with this specific deputy have been similar, and I usually left the conversation 
feeling incapable and nervous. She is noticeably afraid of the director, as are others within the 
organization. My counterpart will not start new projects on her own and all decision-making 
powers seem to be concentrated in one person, which significantly slows progress. Any time I 
approached her with training and/or project ideas, the answer was always that we needed to 
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speak with the director about it. It appears that department managers do not have any real 
decision power and are primarily there for supervisory purposes. Although there is room for 
improvement, my counterpart employs a leadership style that is much closer to being 
approachable and open to new ideas than other Ukrainians I’ve observed. However, the director 
has criticized her for being too friendly with staff, which was discouraging; she feels her team 
trusts her more compared to other managers because she tries to build relationships with them. 
Two of the needs this organization identified on their application for a Peace Corps 
Volunteer were training in conflict resolution and improving customer service. While most 
interactions between administrators and clients are amicable, there have been some instances 
with upset clients and situations that needed to be de-escalated. Early in my service there was a 
client who did not have the correct documents for what she needed to do and raised her voice 
considerably while expressing her anger with the administrator. They informed her she would 
need to return with the right documentation, which angered her further, and my counterpart 
threatened to call the police. Another instance involved an older woman who was yelling in the 
lobby and the authorities were called to de-escalate the situation and escort her out; according to 
one colleague, this situation happens often with the same woman. During a training I organized 
on the topic of change management, an employee asked how they might apply this knowledge to 
working with difficult clients; based on my observations and inquiries like these, it seems that 
conflict resolution is an emerging need that has not really been a significant part of conversations 
in the past. One day I was sitting at my desk when an old woman approached me asking for 
assistance. Considering my lack of adequate language skills and that I am not an administrator, I 
asked her to wait while I found someone to help. She used a cane and clearly was struggling to 
remain standing, so I wanted to find assistance for her as quickly as possible. When I approached 
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an available administrator, identified the woman in need, and tried to explain she needed help, 
the administrator exhibited little interest in the situation. There was little more I could for the 
woman besides instructing her to take a number from the queue and wait. Despite the lack of 
customer service in this situation, there are signs of good service such as smiling administrators 
when clients approach, increasing the number of stations to assist people, and a play area where 
parents can entertain their children while they wait. 
The center does not have a corporate email system for business communication and 
instead uses a messaging service called Viber, which is not much different from other 
applications like Facebook Messenger. There are separate communication groups for each 
department, various committees, and the entire organization. Here they post all information 
related to meetings, trainings, new legislation, requests for reports, among other things; it is also 
used for congratulating people and wishing each other well on holidays. As a business 
communication system, it does not seem very effective or professional because it is difficult to 
search, there is not a clear separation of business versus personal messages, and not all 
employees have access to it – a smartphone is required, which not all staff possess.  
When communication is posted in Viber regarding meetings, reports, trainings, etc., 
requests generally are not far in advance and are sometimes urgent. A cultural trait in Ukraine is 
lack of planning, a consequence of prolonged and sustained instability in the country; people still 
operate in survival mode because that is what the nation has known for so long, and issues with 
planning in this organization are further compounded by constant legislative changes. Meetings 
are typically scheduled the day they are supposed to happen. There have been urgent calls for 
monthly and/or annual reports to present to the city council. It is not unusual for the center’s staff 
to be unaware of trainings and/or seminars with the city’s other departments until the day they 
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occur, maybe the day before if they are lucky. More than once I have planned trainings and/or 
presentations that have been rescheduled multiple times due to ‘surprise’ conflicts or were 
cancelled altogether. Sometimes my counterpart and I planned to meet and discuss our work, but 
upon looking for her I discovered she was on a business trip or at a training. There is a general 
lack of foresight and planning that hinders employees from further developing themselves 
because they do not know what will happen any given day on the job. Despite virtually no 
planning – or perhaps because it doesn’t really happen – Ukrainians are experts at completing 
urgent tasks; i.e. doing things last minute.  
My Work as a Peace Corps Volunteer 
 Being placed at the administrative services center has been advantageous because it was 
an ideal site for conducting this study, but simultaneously one of the most frustrating work 
experiences I’ve ever had. Peace Corps service is difficult for a multitude of reasons and it takes 
time for volunteers to find their niche within their organizations/communities, but despite my 
continued efforts there has not been a lot of measurable success. After several months at the 
center and realizing that their daily work requirements would not allow for significant time 
devoted to projects and/or skills transfer, I decided my service here could best be utilized for 
one-on-one social support and personal/professional development. Additionally, since they had 
never before worked with a volunteer I needed to spend significant time building relationships 
and trust. Ultimately, Peace Corps is all about the relationships we establish and the foundations 
of trust we build in our communities; without these pillars community development work would 
be impossible. 
 At least the first eight months of my service were tumultuous, and this was when I 
completed the bulk of journaling for this study’s autoethnography. I often felt useless, powerless, 
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and underutilized, negative emotions that are apparent in my journaled experiences. There was 
misunderstanding regarding my purpose for being at the center and my counterpart was mostly 
inaccessible. The first two months’ entries contain similar information: I was stuck at my desk 
with nothing to do, I couldn’t find my counterpart, meetings with my counterpart were cancelled, 
and I was constantly approached by clients and felt frustrated because I could never help them. I 
also wrote considerably about how my counterpart would devote time to micromanaging 
anything I did but would not spend time developing projects with me. She also did not attend a 
mandatory Peace Corps training with me, and the organization sent a random employee in her 
place. While it was a professional development opportunity for the other colleague, my 
counterpart and I were never able to get on the same page regarding project design and 
management practices. Over the initial months at the center, I did my best to honor hierarchies 
and the organization’s work culture. It wasn’t until I stepped outside of those boundaries that I 
began to see some results in at least my relationship with my counterpart. 
 Ukrainians can come off as aggressive in their communication, and this is especially 
obvious in a working environment. For more than half a year at the center I tried to be as 
understanding as possible when meetings I arranged with people – mostly my counterpart – were 
almost always cancelled. I felt this was the best approach because it was the most culturally 
mindful. However, one day roughly seven months into service I waited around for hours to have 
a meeting with my counterpart; once I finally accepted it wasn’t going to happen, I took a coffee 
break to clear my head. My counterpart messaged me asking when I’d return, and I’d reached a 
point where I no longer felt I could passively accept the blatant disregard for my time. I aired my 
frustration with her and told her to respect my time because it was just as valuable as hers, which 
provoked an argument between us. We fortunately were able to de-escalate the situation and 
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reach a mutual understanding. Since that day, our relationship has felt more equal than it did 
before and she isn’t so quick to railroad over me. I realized that my assertiveness (it actually felt 
aggressive to me but I have a different perspective on appropriate work culture) was still 
culturally understanding because I was meeting my counterpart on her level, and that was the 
only way she actually heard me. Prior to this experience I was focusing too much on external 
factors and understanding why I was always a last priority, and I didn’t acknowledge that it was 
okay to set boundaries that would help me fulfill my purpose as a volunteer. That day was 
enlightening and demonstrated that although I have a management/administrative style that 
aligns with open systems theory, it’s important to consider how external factors can significantly 
inhibit progress and it might behoove organizations to consider strategies that will mitigate the 
effects of externalities. 
 Apart from the one conflict with my counterpart, I developed relationships with my 
colleagues using a social services approach. I focused extensively on developing rapport, so they 
felt comfortable talking with me about issues and I took every opportunity to encourage them. 
One day my counterpart was having a tense conversation with another colleague, who was 
crying, and although I could not understand the full exchange my counterpart’s tone was 
condescending. I left the office that day with the other colleague and walked with her, during 
which time she confided in me regarding how difficult it is to be yelled at for something you 
have no control over, and that she was tired of answering to so many people. Before we parted I 
told her she had the right to stand up for herself and that she was a capable, intelligent individual; 
she became emotional again and it was clear she didn’t often receive encouraging words in the 
workplace. Conversations like these, smiling at my colleagues (generally Ukrainians don’t smile 
at each other in passing), and learning about who they are as people are strategies that have 
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helped me gain the reputation for being open, kind, and approachable. Although this kind of 
success isn’t measurable, I feel it has been important for them to hear a voice that is most times 
more positive than those from management. 
 I have been unable to complete any larger projects at the center and the one-on-one social 
support has been my biggest contribution. It also is a volunteer’s duty to find other needs in the 
community, so ultimately not all time is spent in the primary organization. In my case, I found a 
local civil society organization that wants to develop and increase their impact on youth in the 
community. We have worked on several projects together and soon will start the strategic 
planning process, so most of my time has been occupied with volunteering for them. However, 
this also means that my time at the center has decreased precipitously and I have been unable to 
continue developing relationships with people there. Yet, after multiple failed attempts to engage 
the center in developing the organization and opportunities for skills transfer, I felt that 
productive service would be found elsewhere. I still spend some time there but at this point in my 
service, when I only have seven months remaining, it is unlikely I will have any large impact on 
the organization’s structure. Despite the lack of measurable success, I feel the one-on-one social 
support has positively impacted individuals and I hope they will use similar approaches when 
interacting with others in their professional lives. 
Discussion 
Administrative Framework 
 The case study conducted for this research demonstrates that at least one Ukrainian local 
bureaucratic institution is mostly relying on a Weberian model. The Rivne Center for 
Administrative Services has clear hierarchy and the organization’s director has most of the 
decision-making power; sometimes decisions must be made by the city council and/or mayor, 
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who hold higher positions than the director. The yearly exams mandated by anti-corruption 
institutions provide a degree of hiring people based on merit, since those who do not pass the test 
are unable to continue working at the center. Administrators and department managers have 
clearly defined duties and little creative freedom for conducting their work outside those 
boundaries. There is some opportunity for upward movement within the organization – both the 
director and my counterpart started as administrators and were promoted. Interactions between 
people of different hierarchical levels illustrate deference to authority, regardless of opinion. 
Although this center pays their civil servants the lowest salaries of any other similar 
administrative centers in Ukraine, it is still one of the most respected and stable careers in Rivne. 
Rules of conduct and legislation come directly from the national government, and the center does 
not have freedom to establish its own standards. 
 The impetus for creating administrative centers like my volunteer placement was demand 
for reform from Ukrainian citizens, which somewhat echoes New Public Management (NPM). 
After Yanukovych resigned from the presidency as Euromaidan was concluding, President 
Poroshenko’s administration began working to reform all levels of government in the country. 
Ultimately the revolution’s civil unrest provoked the government to instigate the most 
comprehensive reform the nation had ever seen. However, there are not many characteristics of 
NPM in the actual implementation of reform. 
Continued Politicization? 
 While the post-revolution environment saw the establishment of anti-corruption 
institutions and mass decentralization at all levels of government, it remains to be seen if 
politicization is an obstacle to reform efficacy. However, this study has at least shown that 
legislation changes rapidly; there are various possible explanations for why this is so, such as 
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political whims, guidance from foreign powers (specifically those in the European Union) for 
how to improve, and internal evaluation. However, the frequency with which the law changes 
suggests it is less related to outside guidance and/or internal evaluation. At the local level, 
legislative inconsistency hinders the ability of civil servants to effectively do their jobs because 
they are unable to adequately learn and implement reforms. At the Rivne Center for 
Administrative Services, staff still largely operate in survival mode and there is little time – or 
energy – to devote to organizational development. Until legislation is more stable, it is unlikely 
that this organization will have the capacity to consider organizational development that could 
contribute to overall long-term reform efficacy.  
 The confusion around testing requirements and measuring civil servants for competency 
also might contribute to politicization. Handwritten exams are problematic because reviewers are 
less able to objectively measure one’s knowledge; people have varying writing skills/styles and 
handwriting quality, and this format leaves too much room for interpretation rather than clear 
analysis. The integrity of civil servants’ answers is compromised because the reader can 
misinterpret them. There also is a question of whether the test takers’ names are kept anonymous 
while their exams are reviewed. Neglecting anonymity could result in judges purposely 
misconstruing answers based on personal feelings towards whoever took the test. To protect civil 
servants from politicized exam review, the government could consider transitioning to more 
objective test formats such as multiple choice and fill-in-the-blank, possibly using an electronic 
system that maintains anonymity.  
 The budget issue that the Rivne Center for Administrative Services experienced in March 
2018 also raises questions of politicization. It is unclear at which level the money was spent to 
the point of not having enough for salaries – i.e. national government, city council, or the center 
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itself – but the lack of uproar from employees when this happened illustrated that these situations 
might occur often. I have been unable to determine if the city and center utilize transparent 
budgeting practices or participatory budgeting, but it seems that the salary funds were either 1) 
not appropriately earmarked or 2) used for other purposes. There are not safeguards in place to 
protect civil servants when funds are misused, and there was total lack of accountability and 
transparency when this happened at the center. 
 Ukrainians still largely rely on their informal networks, which might contribute to 
politicization, as was the case with Slovenia (Bugaric & Kuhelj, 2015). My experiences as a 
Peace Corps Volunteer, inside and outside the organization, illustrated that informal networks are 
the primary mode of information sharing in Ukraine. Often, I was surprised – and impressed – by 
how Ukrainians rapidly disperse information through channels in which I was rarely included. 
The use of Viber, an informal messaging service, as a corporate communication platform 
demonstrates that using formal networks typically considered effective for business is not a 
priority. My reliance on what I consider traditional business communication systems, such as 
email, inhibited my ability to sufficiently integrate into the organization’s culture. Other 
obstacles, such as cultural and language barriers, further hindered my integration into informal 
networks. Without more time in this environment and better language proficiency, it is extremely 
difficult to infiltrate these networks and therefore view reform from the inside looking out. 
Ever-elusive Institutionalization 
 While it is not clear if continued politicization is an obstacle to reform efficacy, this study 
has illustrated that institutionalization is an issue. This case study at the administrative services 
center revealed daily operations in an Ukrainian bureaucratic environment and how cultural 
norms can undermine reform implementation. Persistence of informal networks, maintenance of 
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strict hierarchical structures, aggressive communication styles, unquestioned deference to 
authority, lack of time for organizational development, rigid job duties, and general fear of acting 
on one’s own ideas adversely impact the administrative services center’s trajectory for 
institutionalizing reforms. These obstacles support the second underlying assumption in this 
study because they are characteristics associated with Communist administrative bodies, but they 
should not be attributed only to Ukraine’s experiences as part of the USSR. The country’s earlier 
history should also be considered when assessing how cultural standards impede reform. Ukraine 
has a long history of persecution and culture blending with Russia, and it would be a mistake to 
assume that behaviors inhibiting reform originate only from Communist practices. Behavior 
patterns, or orientations, exhibited by Ukrainians are cross-generational and sometimes the result 
of inherited trauma. An example of inherited trauma are behaviors around food consumption; as 
a member of a Ukrainian family, I have learned that trauma from the Holodomor persists today 
and is a reason my host family is always trying to feed me, regardless of me vocalizing not 
feeling hungry. Another example is media continuing to push the idea that all of Ukraine is 
corrupt, rather than trying to also highlight positive aspects of the reform process. These kinds of 
behaviors are taught to younger generations and consistently conceptualizing Ukraine in a space 
of uncertainty only perpetuates these ideals. It is not uncommon for older generations to wax 
nostalgic about how circumstances were better in the Soviet Union; in some ways they were, as 
there are communities that are dying as a result of more privatized practices. Regardless, there is 
a disconnect between younger and older generations about the direction Ukraine should take, 
which is further complicated by inherited behaviors that perpetuate old ideals. 
 The difficulty I’ve experienced while serving as a volunteer at the center also illustrates 
that reform has not been institutionalized. Aside from frequent legislative change that prevents 
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reform from becoming entrenched in administrative culture, there are persistent cultural ideals 
that impede development. The strict hierarchical structure does not encourage everyday 
administrators to creatively problem solve, consider outside-the-box ideas for organizational 
development, or actively pursue professional development opportunities. Lack of planning and 
failure to fully transition to formal networks for business communication also impede 
institutionalization. Despite these challenges, there is eagerness to implement administrative 
policies and provide efficient services to the public, but constant changes in the law contribute to 
a culture of chaos and instability. External forces significantly impact reform implementation at 
the center. 
Conclusion and Contribution to Future Research 
Conducting this study as a Peace Corps Volunteer provided an unique opportunity to 
observe public administration reform at the local level in Ukraine. My role as a volunteer in the 
community fostered space to build relationships and witness dynamics that might not be seen in 
research conducted on a larger scale. The micro nature of this study illuminates how one public 
administration institution is coping with comprehensive reform occurring in the national 
government, and how culture has influenced the development of this nascent organization. 
Although this research illustrates that reforms are not institutionalized in the Ukrainian psyche, 
more research is needed to determine this trajectory in the long term. There also needs to be 
more analysis regarding the presence or lack of politicization as an obstacle to reform efficacy. 
The Revolution of Dignity occurred just five years ago, and it is too early to draw conclusions 
regarding whether reform will be effective. 
 This study also demonstrates the possibility for autoethnography to be incorporated in 
public administration research methodology; this approach provides flexibility for diving deep 
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and analyzing how culture impacts reform in post-Soviet space. One of the most valuable lessons 
as a volunteer has been that culture influences our lives in ways that are not always visible. The 
failure of reforms to institutionalize in other post-Soviet nations, and experiences documented in 
this study, show that perhaps culture needs to be a part of the conversation for countries 
reforming their governments. The persistence of older ideals in Ukraine often made my work as 
a volunteer frustrating, but not impossible. Many Ukrainians are excited for their country’s 
potential and altering the way we think about reform could open new pathways for nations 
whose cultures may not align with traditional western frameworks. 
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